__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Security Vulnerability in the Sun Ray Server Software Admin GUI [Sun Alert ID: 102779] January 24, 2007 18:00 GMT Number R-111 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Due to a security vulnerability in the Sun Ray Server Software, an unprivileged local user may be able to intercept the Sun Ray administrator's (utadmin) password when the administrator logs in to the Sun Ray Administration Tool. PLATFORM: Sun Ray Server Software 2.0 and 3.0 DAMAGE: An unprivileged local user may be able to intercept the Sun Ray administrator's (utadmin) password when the administrator logs in to the Sun Ray Administration Tool. SOLUTION: Upgrade to the appropriate version. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. An unprivileged local user may be able to ASSESSMENT: intercept the Sun Ray administrator's (utadmin) password when the administrator logs in to the Sun Ray Administration Tool. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/r-111.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: Sun Alert ID: 102779 http://www.sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey= 1-26-102779-1 ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start Sun Alert ID: 102779 *****] Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 102779 Synopsis: Security Vulnerability in the Sun Ray Server Software Admin GUI Category: Security Product: Sun Ray Server Software 3.0, Sun Ray Server Software 2.0 BugIDs: 4950642 Avoidance: Patch State: Resolved Date Released: 23-Jan-2007 Date Closed: 23-Jan-2007 Date Modified: 1. Impact Due to a security vulnerability in the Sun Ray Server Software, an unprivileged local user may be able to intercept the Sun Ray administrator's (utadmin) password when the administrator logs in to the Sun Ray Administration Tool. In addition, a user who obtains read access to the Sun Ray private web server's logfile, or to a similar logfile on a proxy server, can extract the Sun Ray administrator's (utadmin) password. This would allow the user to gain unauthorized access to the Sun Ray Server Software with the privileges of the utadmin user. 2. Contributing Factors This issue can occur in the following releases: SPARC Platform Sun Ray Server Software 2.0 (for Solaris 8, 9) without patch 114880-10 Sun Ray Server Software 3.0 (for Solaris 8, 9, 10) without patch 118979-02 Linux Platform Sun Ray Server Software 3.0 (for JDS R2, RHELAS 3.0, SLES 8.0) without patch 119836-02 To determine the version of the Sun Ray Server Software on a Solaris system, the following command can be run: # /usr/bin/pkginfo -l SUNWuto | grep -i version VERSION: 3.1_32,REV=2005.08.24.08.55 To determine the version of Sun Ray Server Software on a Linux system, the following command can be run: # /bin/rpm -q SUNWuto SUNWuto-3.1-32.21 Notes: Sun Ray Server Software 3.1 and Sun Ray Server Software 3.1.1 are not affected by this issue. This issue can occur both when the Sun Ray web administration GUI is configured to use SSL, and when it is configured not to use SSL. Sun Ray Server Software 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 will not be evaluated regarding the potential impact of the issue described in this Sun Alert document. 3. Symptoms If the Sun Ray server has been affected by the issue described in this Sun Alert, the password may appear in the log file of the web server that is in use. To determine if a Sun Ray server has been affected by this issue, check the web server logfile as follows: 1. Open the web server logfile in an editor. 2. Use the editor's functionality to search for the Sun Ray admininistrator's (utadmin) password. Note: Do not use "grep" to search for the utadmin password, as this might cause the password to be visible in the process list for a very short time, and to be logged to your shell's history. On Sun Ray Server Software 3.0, the logfile location is defined in httpd.conf. The location of the httpd.conf file is stored in the utadmin.conf file: On Solaris: # /usr/bin/grep http.cfile /etc/opt/SUNWut/utadmin.conf admin.http.cfile = /etc/apache/httpd.conf In httpd.conf: CustomLog /var/apache/logs/access_log common ErrorLog /var/apache/logs/error_log On Red Hat Linux Advanced Server Release 3: # /bin/grep http.cfile /etc/opt/SUNWut/utadmin.conf admin.http.cfile = /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf In httpd.conf: CustomLog logs/access_log common ErrorLog logs/error_log The default location of the logfiles is "/var/log/httpd/access_log" and "/var/log/httpd/error_log". On SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8: # /bin/grep http.cfile /etc/opt/SUNWut/utadmin.conf admin.http.cfile = /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf In httpd.conf: CustomLog /var/log/httpd/access_log common ErrorLog /var/log/httpd/error_log The default location of the logfiles is "/var/log/httpd/access_log" and "/var/log/httpd/error_log". On JDS 2: JDS 2 does not provide an Apache web server by default. Use the following to identify the location of the httpd.conf: # grep http.cfile /etc/opt/SUNWut/utadmin.conf On Sun Ray Server Software 2.0, the web server logfiles are located in the following directory: /var/opt/SUNWut/http/utadmin/websites/default_site/logs/ Solution Summary Top 4. Relief/Workaround To work around the described issue, do the following (use the command line tools rather than the Sun Ray web administration GUI): 1. To ensure that nobody else uses the web administration GUI, remove the execute permissions from the "main" binary: # chmod a-x /opt/SUNWut/cgi-bin/main To undo the workaround: # chmod a+x /opt/SUNWut/cgi-bin/main 2. Ensure that only the root user has read access rights to the web server logfiles by changing the permissions of those files using a command such as chmod(1) as required. By default: with Sun Ray Server Software 3.0/Solaris, using Solaris bundled Apache, the web server logfiles are world-readable. with Sun Ray Server Software 3.0/Linux, using Apache, the directory containing the web server logfiles is accessible for the root user only. with Sun Ray Server Software 2.0 and earlier, the web server logfiles are accessible for the root user and group "other" only. 3. Change the Sun Ray administrator's password by doing the following: # /opt/SUNWut/sbin/utpw Enter new UT admin password: Re-enter new UT admin password: Enter old UT admin password: Changing LDAP password... Done. Changing password file... Done. Note: If this server is part of a failover configuration, please run utpw(1M) on all servers. 4. If you have used the Sun Ray administrator's password for other purposes, change that password as well. 5. Resolution This issue is addressed in the following releases: SPARC Platform Sun Ray Server Software 2.0 (for Solaris 8, 9) with patch 114880-10 or later Sun Ray Server Software 3.0 (for Solaris 8, 9, 10) with patch 118979-02 or later Linux Platform Sun Ray Server Software 3.0 (for JDS R2, RHELAS 3.0, SLES 8.0) with patch 119836-02 or later Note: The above patch revisions do not clean up old logfiles, and they do not re-render pages which have already been displayed in your browser. After patch installation it is recommended that the administrator password be changed (using the method described in section 4, Relief/Workaround). In addition, before logging into the Sun Ray web administration GUI, users should either restart the browser or hit shift-reload on the GUI's login screen. This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS" basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these agreements. Copyright 2000-2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved. [***** End Sun Alert ID: 102779 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 (7x24) FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@ciac.org Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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