__________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN IBM - Potential Buffer Overflow and Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities [1229918] February 16, 2006 20:00 GMT Number Q-131 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Several buffer overflow vulnerabilities and one directory traversal vulnerability inthe Key View viewers used in Lotus Notes. PLATFORM: Product categories: Software Messaging Applications Advanced Messaging Lotus Notes Operating system(s): Windows Software version: 6.0.5, 7.0, 6.0.1.1, 6.5.4, 6.0.4, 6.0.1.2, 6.5, 6.5.3.1, 6.5.1, 6.0.1.3, 6.5.2, 6.5.2.1, 6.5.3, 6.0.2.1, 6.0.3, 6.0.2.2, 6.0, 6.0.1 DAMAGE: A buffer Overflow and directory traversal vulnerability. SOLUTION: Follow the product work around. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. To successfully exploit these issues, an ASSESSMENT: attacker would need to send a specially crafted file attachment to users, and the users would have to double click and "View" the attachment. ______________________________________________________________________________ LINKS: CIAC BULLETIN: http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/q-131.shtml ORIGINAL BULLETIN: IBM - 1229918 http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=475&uid=swg 21229918 CVE: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name= CVE-2005-2618 ______________________________________________________________________________ [***** Start 1229918 *****] Potential Buffer Overflow and Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities in Lotus Notes File Viewers Problem Secunia contacted IBM Lotus to report five buffer overflow vulnerabilities and one directory traversal vulnerability in the KeyView viewers used in Lotus Notes. To successfully exploit these issues, an attacker would need to send a specially crafted file attachment to users, and the users would have double click and "View" the attachment. The advisory address is as follows: http://secunia.com/advisories/16280/ Solution These issues were reported to IBM Lotus Quality Engineering as SPR# KEMG6FZR4Q, KEMG6FZRJD, KEMG6F2RCN, KEMG6F3PBT, KEMG6F3NZD, KEMG6FYPF2 and have been addressed in Notes 6.5.5 and Notes 7.0.1. Refer to the Upgrade Central site for details on upgrading Notes/Domino to these releases. In general, users are strongly urged to use caution when opening or viewing unsolicited file attachments. To work around these issues in previous releases of Notes, the affected file viewers can be disabled. The buffer overflow vulnerabilities affect the following files: kvarce.dll, uudrdr.dll, tarrdr.dll and htmsr.dll. The directory traversal vulnerability affects the kvarce.dll file. There are three options for disabling these viewers: 1. Action: Delete the keyview.ini file in the Notes program directory. Results: When a user clicks View (for any file), a dialog box will be displayed with the message "Unable to locate the viewer configuration file." 2. Action: Delete the problem files (ziprdr.dll, uudrdr.dll, htmsr.dll, tarrdr.dll). Result: When a user tries to view the specific file types (html pages, zip/tar/uud archives), a dialog box will be displayed with the message "The viewer display window could not be initialized." All other file types work without returning the error message. 3. Action: Comment out specific lines in keyview.ini (by preceding the line with an asterisk * ) for any references to the problem files (dlls). For example: [KVARCVE] * 132=ziprdr.dll * 194=tarrdr.dll * 167=uudrdr.dll [KVDOCVE] 2=afsr.dll -1=hexsr.dll 117=mifsr.dll 13=dcasr.dll 32=dw4sr.dll 23=exesr.dll 153=afsr.dll 207=mimesr.dll 208=mimesr.dll *210=htmsr.dll *251=htmsr.dll Result: When a user tries to view the specific file types (html files, tar/uud archives), a dialog box will be displayed with the message "The viewer display window could not be initialized." Notes: The attachments will not auto-execute upon opening or viewing the email message itself; the file attachment must be opened by the user using one of the affected file viewers (from the menu bar, Select "Attachment", then select "View"). The Domino server is not affected by these issues. [***** End 1229918 *****] _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of IBM for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. 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Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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