-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX autofsd Vulnerability November 24, 1998 16:00 GMT Number J-013 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A vulnerability has been identified in autofsd, a RPC server that answers file system mount and unmount requests from the autofs file system. PLATFORM: IRIX 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.5.1. Other versions of IRIX were not tested but may also be vulnerable. DAMAGE: If exploited, a local user could gain root access. SOLUTION: Apply available patches or disable the autofsd daemon. The steps are outlined in the Temporary Solution section. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Risk is high. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated this ASSESSMENT: vulnerability and recommends that the steps in this advisory be acted upon as soon as possible. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Revised on November 24, 1998 with patch information ] [ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: Vulnerability in IRIX autofsd Title: RSI.0010.10-02-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD Number: 19981005-01-PX Date: November 23 ,1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ----------------------- - --- Issue Specifics --- - ----------------------- The autofsd(1M) daemon is used to automatically mount remote file systems. The Repent Security, Inc (RSI) group has publicly reported a vulnerability in the IRIX autofsd daemon which can lead to a root compromise. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue has been corrected in future releases of IRIX. - -------------- - --- Impact --- - -------------- The autofsd(1M) daemon is installed by default on IRIX. A local user account on the vulnerable system is not required in order to exploit the autofsd(1M) daemon. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by using carefully crafted network packets that are sent to the autofsd(1M) daemon. The vulnerability can lead to a root compromise. This vulnerability was reported by RSI.0010.10-02-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD: http://www.repsec.com/advisory/0010.html This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. - -------------------------- - --- Temporary Solution --- - -------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to disable the autofs(1M) daemon thereby removing the vulnerability until patches can be installed. ================= **** WARNING **** ================= Disabling autofs(1M) daemon will prevent users from automatically mounting remote file systems. The automount(1M) daemon can be used as a temporary workaround. See the ONC3/NFS Administrator's Guide which is available online from the insight program or via the web: http://techpubs.sgi.com/library/ 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Verify autofs(1M) daemon is enabled. # chkconfig Flag State ==== ===== autofs on 3) Disable autofs(1M) daemon. # chkconfig autofs off 4) Verify autofs(1M) daemon has been disabled. # chkconfig Flag State ==== ===== autofs off 5) Reboot the system # reboot - ---------------- - --- Solution --- - ---------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no Note 1 IRIX 4.x no Note 1 IRIX 5.0.x no Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x no Note 1 IRIX 5.2 no Note 1 IRIX 5.3 no Note 2 IRIX 6.0.x no Note 1 IRIX 6.1 no Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 3392 Note 2 & 3 IRIX 6.3 yes 3391 Note 2 & 3 IRIX 6.4 yes 3250 Note 2 & 3 IRIX 6.5 yes 6.5.2 Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.1 yes 6.5.2 Note 3 & 4 IRIX 6.5.2 no Note 5 NOTES 1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system. See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix2.html for more information. 2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode and patches will no longer be produced when it retires. See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix1.html for more information. 3) See "Temporary Solution" section. 4) IRIX 6.5.2 needs to be installed to remove this vulnerability. 5) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.2 CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your SGI Support Provider or download the IRIX 6.5.2 Maintenance Release Stream from http://support.sgi.com/ or ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/relstream/ Information about installing IRIX 6.5.2 can be found at: http://support.sgi.com/6.5/installing.html Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively. For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirror of sgigate) lags behind and does not do a real-time update of ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.3250 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07800 10 README.patch.3250 Algorithm #2 (sum): 1865 10 README.patch.3250 MD5 checksum: DC08AA3C9BE672E23BA7B98511A8AE64 Filename: patchSG0003250 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29714 4 patchSG0003250 Algorithm #2 (sum): 46399 4 patchSG0003250 MD5 checksum: 7CCCD06F9F9287FABB4C1F089540AB65 Filename: patchSG0003250.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26654 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 54236 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 27672AF486D3789560E33AE368C244A1 Filename: patchSG0003250.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29537 3 patchSG0003250.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 19316 3 patchSG0003250.idb MD5 checksum: C8380CE292B058545E101A9C80F0EFC5 Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15127 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 4624 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man MD5 checksum: 03DBA9D1E4F287CE4282172355849234 Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45181 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 56554 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw MD5 checksum: C52C4A858EB87C788DB53D6DDC37E9CC Filename: README.patch.3391 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63933 11 README.patch.3391 Algorithm #2 (sum): 22537 11 README.patch.3391 MD5 checksum: 768EB3E6B5797DF1D7DB4506FDBCD1F0 Filename: patchSG0003391 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00828 5 patchSG0003391 Algorithm #2 (sum): 19000 5 patchSG0003391 MD5 checksum: 8BDF1FE22C2E52B93BD3A2D1199F7A0A Filename: patchSG0003391.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30886 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 45572 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: CAB0A7DDCB89BD2547DA9A8A033A6BF3 Filename: patchSG0003391.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49029 2 patchSG0003391.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 4863 2 patchSG0003391.idb MD5 checksum: 58A03CEE1B17FAFCDBFBA27D8C5A5BA9 Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54375 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 55561 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man MD5 checksum: C884D4375D6B96502628ABC2253E5CB0 Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10211 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 11471 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 27714AED52EF96FAF1691760BF05E5C3 Filename: README.patch.3392 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31068 12 README.patch.3392 Algorithm #2 (sum): 10078 12 README.patch.3392 MD5 checksum: B120B48BD7DF8D681BC9A27FD01C65D0 Filename: patchSG0003392 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19916 6 patchSG0003392 Algorithm #2 (sum): 7998 6 patchSG0003392 MD5 checksum: 091E12D3B0EC7462CBFAD9BAA37AC7AE Filename: patchSG0003392.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41641 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 61503 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 0884FA51E7569BD1BD2B39D324322B87 Filename: patchSG0003392.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33117 2 patchSG0003392.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 8644 2 patchSG0003392.idb MD5 checksum: 54918E34BF30280A91F2731E328791AC Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63737 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 55562 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man MD5 checksum: 041653A0488E9B543ACD105CC4F20CF3 Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 42469 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 22631 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 1F61453E0E31C8117A2AA03C0F2662D6 - ----------------------- - --- Acknowledgments --- - ----------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the users of the Internet Community at large for their assistance in this matter. - ----------------------------------------------------------- - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNlnkZLQ4cFApAP75AQFg1AQAxNBjtE+/uhFEzu5T/5sLPn6AqqwXRWg+ nsn/pVamZFaL8HxTMKenLVvW2nzeTh2iQEUSOAqlw009AJaCO+1DLlppnkWHt/iL ZCS8G7mJiZ6LKd50dA4t8rUvISWlWqpwaQ8AUzce5rimP67/5nxcUt4mBDzXo5zm vce8KMXIdUk= =i9JD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) J-003: SGI IRIX On-Line Customer Registration Vulnerabilities J-004: SunOS ftp client Vulnerability J-005: SGI IRIX at(1) Vulnerability J-006: NFS mountd Buffer Overflow Vulnerability J-007: HP OpenView Omniback II Vulnerability J-008: FreeBSD TCP RST Denial of Service Vulnerability J-009: Cisco IOS Command History Release at Login Prompt J-010: SGI Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities ( xterm(1), Xaw library) J-011: Microsoft IE 4.01 Untrusted Scripted Paste (Cuartango Vul.) J-012: SGI IRIX routed(1M) Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNjjlsbnzJzdsy3QZAQExbgP/dLlbyftIiRdDKam24SKO8VP9aYUy/F/E 7m+T6FQ3MggKe/R65lAlclLhUWlMtum3MNI4g2Qa5WKp+exqnX2pWfUpMonusKOi oq+79UNc0QvsP1v+weVbGtdWYK/tQQyzPFkwcAOf69Ha6L1GKzvprbgfJSOQ2W5A jMrl1TgZiRM= =KE8C -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----