-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX lp(1) Security Vulnerability April 7, 1998 20:00 GMT Number I-042 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: SGI has identified a vulnerability in the lp(1) program and associated printing subsystem. PLATFORM: IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2, 5.3, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. DAMAGE: If exploited, a buffer overflow condition may occur. This vulnerability may also be utilized to gain root access. A local account is required. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY This vulnerability has been publically discussed. Silicon ASSESSMENT: Graphics Inc. HIGHLY RECOMMENDS that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphic Inc. Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: lp(1) Security Vulnerabilities Title: AUSCERT AA-96.12 Number: 19980402-01-PX Date: April 2, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------ - ---- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------ The lp(1) program is used to submit files for printing. A potential buffer overflow condition has been identified with the lp(1) program and associated printing subsystem. With an appropriately crafted set of arguments, arbitrary user commands could be executed with elevated privileges. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - --------------- - ---- Impact --- - --------------- The lp(1) program and printing subsystem are installed by default on all IRIX systems. A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both locally and remotely. This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root privileges. This vulnerability has been publically discussed and related issues have been reported in AUSCERT advisory AA-96.12. - --------------------------- - ---- Temporary Solution --- - --------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the printing subsystem. *************** *** WARNING *** *************** Removing the print subsystem will remove all printing capability from the system. Installing the patches below is recommended over removal of the print subsystem. If the print subsystem is removed, at a later time when the patches below are to be installed, the print subsystem will first have to be reinstalled from original IRIX distribution CDs before the patches. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Remove the vulnerable subsystem. # /usr/sbin/versions -v remove print 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - ----------------- - ---- Solution --- - ----------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 2166 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 6.2 yes 2167 IRIX 6.3 yes 2168 IRIX 6.4 yes 2169 NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2166 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33606 8 README.patch.2166 Algorithm #2 (sum): 23714 8 README.patch.2166 MD5 checksum: 95B0AB6CE4C96D7BA22F520360B9A4F7 Filename: patchSG0002166 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39199 1 patchSG0002166 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29039 1 patchSG0002166 MD5 checksum: E44479E23F273051BFA04491524B2C8F Filename: patchSG0002166.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41214 1 patchSG0002166.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 37103 1 patchSG0002166.idb MD5 checksum: B855B3AFEBC0606F88697EC1EA961824 Filename: patchSG0002166.print_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64133 81 patchSG0002166.print_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 39793 81 patchSG0002166.print_sw MD5 checksum: F3ADEE60570BF69DE537D16CCE7D35D0 Filename: README.patch.2167 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54129 8 README.patch.2167 Algorithm #2 (sum): 24902 8 README.patch.2167 MD5 checksum: CAD788CE10F8C26EF5ECB1CBBBB9990F Filename: patchSG0002167 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32110 1 patchSG0002167 Algorithm #2 (sum): 31366 1 patchSG0002167 MD5 checksum: CC3EE93FE5D4A52E394D6F2FE82F787E Filename: patchSG0002167.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11685 1 patchSG0002167.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 36835 1 patchSG0002167.idb MD5 checksum: E568F4180BE18E2183E65FAAD7CE342B Filename: patchSG0002167.print_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14051 101 patchSG0002167.print_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 31600 101 patchSG0002167.print_sw MD5 checksum: 7EDB4F42375940427B97EC2E8F949C70 Filename: README.patch.2168 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22298 8 README.patch.2168 Algorithm #2 (sum): 25041 8 README.patch.2168 MD5 checksum: 9C63BB8A301C8052BECB0B02A741A94F Filename: patchSG0002168 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11594 1 patchSG0002168 Algorithm #2 (sum): 31103 1 patchSG0002168 MD5 checksum: 934E0CC9BC24F87A74668A00EDE3DC71 Filename: patchSG0002168.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12942 1 patchSG0002168.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 36247 1 patchSG0002168.idb MD5 checksum: 97BB1C7385D71AC836C7A884ABE60D15 Filename: patchSG0002168.print_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19989 100 patchSG0002168.print_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 39255 100 patchSG0002168.print_sw MD5 checksum: 228F3EB30E9A62166EA7A489F4D5FFEF Filename: README.patch.2169 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18635 8 README.patch.2169 Algorithm #2 (sum): 22236 8 README.patch.2169 MD5 checksum: D624EEF3039F8F9A0F429982A3FBB356 Filename: patchSG0002169 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52493 1 patchSG0002169 Algorithm #2 (sum): 34907 1 patchSG0002169 MD5 checksum: 31F5566CEA24C3679E659E449B5A23E6 Filename: patchSG0002169.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54959 1 patchSG0002169.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 35889 1 patchSG0002169.idb MD5 checksum: D0B5BDA2F16F2B47C74ED1F40C4179B2 Filename: patchSG0002169.print_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 08735 82 patchSG0002169.print_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 20700 82 patchSG0002169.print_sw MD5 checksum: 8B6C0769E99B57381395570946C0C348 - ------------------------- - ---- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Internet community and AUSCERT for their involvement in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNSQBkrQ4cFApAP75AQGcXAP/YnqAM+PC41nsGBXFf3RKk3MkY8S5lMm+ 9QkDddi6FVrLaL4cJjARmChzPelidkFyw+PqsZPeGzbaqeUPzcoSlrbvU5RfAmm6 8cOZobntpuE9GTgAETot/ZvtOmxbeclyaZwPGMT9i/8Z4lLWfNf//bozuxUclcnl BHX1KBatNhE= =ecND - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphic Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphic Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) I-032: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (vacation, dtaction) I-033: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (ndd, rpc.cmsd) I-034: Internet Cookies I-035: SGI Vulnerabilities (startmidi/stopmidi, datman/cdman, cdplayer) I-036: FreeBSD Denial-of Service LAND Attacks I-037: FreeBSD mmap Vulnerability I-038: Ascend Routing Hardware Vulnerabilities I-039: HP-UX inetd Vulnerability I-040: SGI Netscape Navigator Vulnerabilities I-041: Performer API Search Tool 2.2 pfdispaly.cgi Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNSqtMLnzJzdsy3QZAQEvIAQA9533ElleLiTlYz7bFwnzHUIj4FxBbr0x quvvf7FwyIycPLtpTb1P7usBvw30TIr1Rvme1WFSwjjZbEXl3iA+J7wzD8rUQZzI B+mS/h6wr/eVvO1njmlztiTjAYDphFSGLu6caCtin8a/95cqo46JwPlm0AmQV7Br VH+ZRRrx4Xg= =T5lH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----