VIRUS-L Digest   Thursday, 23 Apr 1992    Volume 5 : Issue 92

Today's Topics:

The security problem in Novell NetWare (PC)
F-Prot & DATAMON (PC)
Question - Azusa (PC)
On searchiong the original INt 13h (PC)
Don't understand Norvegian infection... (PC)
Re: Polymorphic Viruses (PC)
Question re anti-virus products (PC)
Re: Vlad the Inhaler? (Win 3.1 upgrade) (PC)
Re: Polymorphic List (PC)
Filler warning with SCAN & CPAV (PC)
Re: Defence from mutating viruses. (PC)
New Datalock variant found (PC)
RE: Mutant detection (PC)
Biohazard symbol for computer viruses?
lies and damn lies
CODE 252 Virus - Rival Vaccine info (Mac)
Checklist part 9

VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
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   Ken van Wyk

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    16 Apr 92 16:54:41 +0000
>From:    bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: The security problem in Novell NetWare (PC)

As I promised, here is an extract of the document that mentioned the
problem:

> What really caused Jon's test results?  Well I believe that the following
> is what really happened in Paramus that day.  In pre-NetWare 386
> systems the server evaluated your rights to a directory at the time the
> directory handle is allocated.  This information is not updated until the
> directory handle is reevaluated (reallocated, or changed).  This causes a
> discrepancy between the reported rights and the actual rights.  To
> complicate the issue even further, there are different versions of the
> RIGHTS program available that show different rights.  One version
> displays your actual rights to the directory handle while another version
> displays your "granted" rights.  This only matters when you have just
> changed your rights to a directory to which you have already mapped a
> drive.  Then your "granted" rights will be different from your actual
> rights.  I surmise that this is what happened in Paramus.  During the
> testing they simply revoked a right and then ran the test.  This caused
> the apparent breach of security.  As a side light, let me point out that a
> similar thing happens with security equivalence.  Your equivalence is
> determined when you login and will not be changed by changes to the
> system during your session (ie. if you are supervisor equivalent and that
> is removed, you will remain equivalent until you logout).

The document is by James Brown (James_Brown@NPD.Novell.COM) and he
further suggests that for any security-related problems and especially
viruses you contact Eric Babcock at (801) 429-7895. Unfortunately, I
don't have Eric Babcock's e-mail address.

Now, maybe I misunderstand what the above quote really says, but to me
it means that some versions of the NetWare have a serious security
bug - the rights that you revoke remain in effect until you logout.

Could somebody who knows Novel NetWare well explain us whether it is
really so, and if yes, in which versions of the NetWare is this bug
really present.

Regards,
Vesselin
- --
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev        Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Bontchev@Informatik.Uni-Hamburg.De  Fachbereich Informatik - AGN, rm. 107 C
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: -226    Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, D-2000, Hamburg 54

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 12:01:58 -0600
>From:    "Norm J. Harman Jr." <NHARMAN@UKANVM.BITNET>
Subject: F-Prot & DATAMON (PC)

  Hello,
The following message appears on several known to be clean machines.

    c:\virstop
    VIRSTOP cannot be installed.
    This may be caused by an active virus or an incompatible DOS.

Config.sys
  FILES=40
  BUFFERS=30
  DEVICE=C:\DOS\EMM.SYS
  DEVICE=C:\UTIL\FPROT\VIRSTOP.EXE
  DEVICE=C:\DOS\SETVER.EXE

Autoexec.bat
  @echo off
  ...  < deleted >
  c:\pctools\pc-cache
  DATAMON /TRACKER+

Obviously virstop is indeed loaded.  If the DATAMON line is REMoved then all is
fine and we get the normal message "VIRSTOP is allready loaded." DATAMON is
PC-Tools v7.1 Data Monitor.  My Question is has Virstop been disabled?  Will it
detect a virus on this machine.  In general how can a user verify that the
anti-virus software he/she has installed is actually operating as expected?
Would it be possible for AV authors to include a test string/file (NOT A VIRUS)
just a file that contains some dummy string that the software looks for?
Then at any time the user could verify the proper operation of his software.


                                   Thank You in advance,
                                   Norm J. Harman Jr.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 13:04:50 -0400
>From:    LQ4@psuvm.psu.edu
Subject: Question - Azusa (PC)

I am looking for information on a virus that was identified as Azusa
using the f-prot virus detection software.  I know one of our units
was infected and I was able to deal with it.  However, curiosity has
me wishing additional details. . .  Information can be directed to me
personally.

     Thanks!
           Pam

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 11:37:49 -0500
>From:    miguel@roxanne.nuclecu.unam.mx (Miguel de Icaza A.)
Subject: On searchiong the original INt 13h (PC)

>> How do you find the Int13 entry point?  Simple, really.  Use
>> DEBUG to search system ROM for typical int13 code, and try it:
>
>> C:>DEBUG
>
>> - - s f000:0 l FFFF 80 FA 80
>
> Good guess... But totally wrong. :-) On my XT the INT 13h handler for
> the hard disk is on the hard disk controllers's EPROM and is at
> address 0C800:0000h.

Have you ever tried Thunderbyte Scan? it has an option (-direct), this
options allows TBSCAN to run and scan your disk without risk (no
matter if a virus is resident in memory), because the programs
includes a debugger (I think Vesselin calls this tunneling) which is
able to find the entry point for Int 21h and Int 13h thus skipping any
TSR monitor/virus loaded in RAM.

Miguel de Icaza

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 11:57:24 -0500
>From:    miguel@roxanne.nuclecu.unam.mx (Miguel de Icaza A.)
Subject: Don't understand Norvegian infection... (PC)

Vesselin Bontchev writes:

> work if (1) the virus modifies the FST in memory, or (2) uses the
> Norvegian infection method (Frisk, is there a virus which actually
> uses it? Which one?), or (3) masquerades writes as reads like the

What is the Norvegian infection method?

Miguel de Icaza

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 20:03:11 +0000
>From:    goldsmit@iguana.cis.ohio-state.edu (eric richey goldsmith)
Subject: Re: Polymorphic Viruses (PC)

I am new to this news group - please bear with me.  I am taking a
technical writing class this quarter in which writing is done in
groups.  My group has tentatively decided on the topic of identifying
polymorphic viruses.  We are all computer science majors but have
little experience with viruses.  One of our concerns is that there may
not be enough information available on the topic to write a 20 page
document.  Can anyone make any suggestions as to whether they think
this topic would be 'researchable'.  Can anyone provide sources of
information for polymorphic viruses for PC's (IBM).  ANY input would
be appreciated.  Thanks.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Apr 92 20:48:05 +0000
>From:    mkarg@wpi.WPI.EDU (Michael Joseph Karg)
Subject: Question re anti-virus products (PC)

	What software at ftp site 129.109.9.21 would be the best to
have in cases of an infection?  Are any of these any good?  I've heard
quite a bit of talk about what is better.  I currently own McFee's
Scan and that is all.  Replies via news of e-mail appreciated.

Mike.

- --
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
mkarg@wpi.wpi.edu (Michael J. Karg)
- -the plain brown .signature-
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Apr 92 03:13:15 +0000
>From:    dmarcher@acsu.buffalo.edu (Dave Archer)
Subject: Re: Vlad the Inhaler? (Win 3.1 upgrade) (PC)

HODGE@astro.pc.ab.com (24893, HODGE,ROBERT E.) writes:
>dmarcher@acsu.buffalo.edu (Dave Archer) writes:
>>   I upgraded to Windows 3.1, and had an interesting problem.  My D:
>> drive got semi-trashed and I saw that a task with the title "Vlad the
>> Inhaler" was running.

>  That phrase, "Vlad the Inhaler", shows up in the file NWRES.DLL, which
>is part of the Norton Desktop program.  (At least on my system.)

Yes.  Somebody from Symantec confirmed that "Vlad the
Inhaler" is an, ah, feature of Norton Desktop for Windows.

Trashed disk most likely a conflict with the new version of
SmartDrive & my SCSI drive.

No virus (Oh joy!).

Dave

- ---
  Dave Archer  |  Internet: dmarcher@acsu.buffalo.edu
               |    Bitnet: V116KZND@UBVMS
               |     GEnie: D.ARCHER

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Apr 92 21:45:57 +0000
>From:    Fridrik Skulason <frisk@complex.is>
Subject: Re: Polymorphic List (PC)

In Message 9 Apr 92 03:09:00 GMT, 0004886415@mcimail.com (Joe Wells) writes:

>The subject of Polymorphic viruses seems to be poping up here and there. So
>here is a list of the current viruses of this ilk:

Perhaps it is necessary to divide the polymorphic viruses into several
groups - depending on how great the variability is.  Assuming the
viruses are encrypted, and we only consider the difference between
different instances of the decryption routines, I see the following
possibilities:

 1) Identical code - only different constants.  This does not qualify as
    polymorphism in my opinion.

 2) Identical code, but with "garbage" instructions in between.

 3) Variable code, but the differences are small enough so that a
    single virus signature (possibly including a wildcard) is possible.
    (Ontario is an example of this),

 4) Veriable code, but it is possible to use a small set of signatures,
    (Whale falls into this category).

 5) Code too variable for signatures to be possible - such as the MtE.

- -frisk

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Apr 92 21:19:12 +0700
>From:    swimmer@stage.hanse.de (Morton Swimmer)
Subject: Filler warning with SCAN & CPAV (PC)

kenm@maccs.dcss.mcmaster.ca (...Jose) writes:
> 	A colleague has the following, peculiar problem: He loads the
> CPAV TSR from his AUTOEXEC.BAT, and later tries to use McAfee's SCAN.
> SCAN will sometimes report that the FILLER virus is there, ubt often
> will not.  Oddly, CPAV doesn't seem to know about FILLER, so he's a
> wee bit nervous.

This doesn't surprise me a bit. CPAV and other scanner do not mix
well. What probably is happening is that CPAV is not excrypting the
scan strings in memory, so scan SCAN thinks it sees that virus when it
scans memory. Try deinstalling CPAV.

Cheers, Morton

- ---
sent by stage.hanse.de

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 18 Apr 92 13:34:38 +0300
>From:    kiae!rtech!vl!ALS@vl.ts.kiev.ua
Subject: Re: Defence from mutating viruses. (PC)

rmg536668@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Ryan M. Grant) writes to:

>   kiae!rtech!vl!ALS@vl.ts.kiev.ua writes:

>   >    ... made some
>   >    testing of what would be if I can change some codes of MS-DOS resident
>   >    part to make it more virus-safe.
>   >    ...changes in MSDOS.SYS (in memory, of course, not
>   >    in disk file).
>
>           Does this mean I run the program from the command line?
>           Can I set it up, in other words, not to run?

     Yes, you can or you can't run it. So for everyday work you run it
but in few cases, when you try to restore loosed data from disk,
reformat it and so on you can't install this antiviral systems.

>   >    [RLock can remove the read-only bit]
>
>           If your program can remove the read-ony bit, how hard would it be
>           for a virus programmer who has seen your program?

   By the way, my program makes ReadOnly bit stronger but not removes it.
Virus programmer can remove this defence if and only if:

           1. He has all DOS'es, for what this defence was made
              (now - MS-DOS 4.0, 4.01 and 5.0, tomorrow MS-DOS 6.0 and
               may be COMPAQ-DOS or DR-DOS)

           2. He has all my programs for these DOS'es, because even in
              DOS 4.01 and DOS 5.0 changes in MSDOS.SYS are differs greatly


>   >    prevent direct access to disk
>   >    to all programs EXCEPT COMMAND.COM.
>
>           Do any programs useful try this? Disk caches?
>           (Just looked and norton cache uses DOS, but how about the others?)

    NCACHE don't, but it uses other virus-like trick, so you can load it before
my programs. But many of Norton Utilities, such as NDD, UNERASE, CALIBRATE
really do. And at least one editor ( BRIEF, if I am not mistaken ) accesses
disk directly via Int 13.

>   >    As a result only very DOS-depended viruses can ignore this defence.
>
>           What could they do?  Are DOS versions that hard to keep track of?
>           What if DOS 5 sticks around a while?

  They could restore modified parts of MSDOS.SYS and IO.SYS. Just now it's
not very hard to do it. But if somebody can support this idea (or can support
me :-) and can write
such defence for other DOSes or regularly place it at other positions of
MSDOS.SYS and IO.SYS then virus had to:

         1. Define difference between PC-DOS, MS-DOS, DR-DOS, ..., of the
            same version, because all of them answer: "I am DOS X.Y",
            but their codes differs too much

         2. Have in its (virus) codes original and not very short parts of
            IO.SYS and MSDOS.SYS files for any of the above DOSes
            (to replace by them modified parts of files)

         3. Select concrete position and length of modified files

         4. And be sure that with new DOS version all this big efforts
            would be lost.


Alexander Shehovtsov
- --
Alexander Shehovtsov,      (044) 266-70-28 (9:00 - 18:00 Kiev, Ukraine) voice
           als@vl.ts.kiev.ua    Relcom | 2:463/30.5  or  2:463/34.4   FidoNet

------------------------------

Date:    18 Apr 92 10:38:13 -0400
>From:    "Tarkan Yetiser" <TYETISER@ssw02.ab.umd.edu>
Subject: New Datalock variant found (PC)

   Hello everyone,
It was brought to our attention that a variant of Datalock virus is
found in the wild (DC/Virginia area). We received a copy of the virus,
and did a quick-and-dirty analysis. It appears that the virus is a new
strain of Datalock, or rather a hacked and a very buggy version of
Datalock.
   The only reason for our concern (and thus this posting) is that the
latest versions of common virus scanners (Scan 89b, F-prot 2.03a) fail
to identify the virus in EXE files. Our VDSFSCAN fails in a similar
way, but works when WHOLE flag is set to YES (meaning scan every byte
of the file). Original Datalock signatures are valid and can be used to
identify the virus. Being quite dumb, this variant is not a serious
threat.
   Here is an overview based on a preliminary analysis. The following
information may be inaccurate, so you are warned. Also, we would like
to mention that the analysis was done using Dis86 (an interactive
debugger written by James R. Van Zandt (603-888-2272), and the program
is available on Simtel and its mirrors):
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Location/Date: DC/Virginia area, April 1992
* Related virus(es): Datalock
* Suggested name: Datalock-2
* Responds to RU-THERE calls as follows:
   ...
   mov  AH, BEh
   int  21h
   cmp  AX, 4321h
   jz   virus_is_resident
   ...
  (In English, the virus establishes a new function for Int 21h, and
   sets the contents of AX register to 4321h to indicate its presence.)
* Signature to identify the virus:

   C3 1E A1 2C 00 50 8C D8 48 8E D8 81 2E 03 00 80 00 40 8E D8

* Takes 80h paragraphs (or 2K) of memory when resident. Directly
  manipulates memory control blocks to remain resident.
* Hooks INT 21h, and during infection INT 24h
* Virus body is appended to the end of files, and file size grows by
  1043 bytes. Both EXE and COM files are infected similarly. Due to
  bugs in the viral code, infected EXE programs will not further the
  infection. Original CS:IP is left intact, and scanners checking
  around the entry point will not be able to find it.
* For COM programs, a jump is inserted at the beginning of the program
  so that the control is directed to the virus at the end of the file.
* Damage trigger: After 1 (or more) hour of memory residency. Uses DOS
  INT 21h with subfunc 2Ch, and checks CH (hour).
* Payload: Formats track 0 on any diskettes in drive A: and B:, and
  second physical hard disk (81h).
* Infection trigger: Load/exec (4b00), open existing gile (3d), and
  find first (11h). Checks for READ-ONLY attribute, and changes it to
  ARCHIVE if necessary. File date/time stamp as well as the original
  attribute is preserved after infection. Files less than 9316 bytes
  are not infected. There are many instances of hooking INT 24h and
  restoring it, suggesting sloppy coding. Infects COMMAND.COM. Due to a
  bug, the virus will corrupt files besides COM and EXE, such as the
  ones with TXT extension.
* Does NOT contain the string 'Datalock version 1.0'
* Note: The virus is well-behaved enough to spread in network
  environments if Modify and Write rights are given. However, we did
  not get a chance to test this hypothesis. (The LAN admin here keeps a
  butcher's knife in the ofice; yes yes, he is a CNE and knows all
  about viruses :-)).

Regards,

Tarkan Yetiser
VDS Advanced Research Group               P.O. Box 9393
(410) 247-7117                            Baltimore, MD 21228
e-mail:  tyetiser@ssw02.ab.umd.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 18 Apr 92 15:37:00 +0000
>From:    Joe Wells <0004886415@mcimail.com>
Subject: RE: Mutant detection (PC)

tyetiser@ssw02.ab.umd.edu Tarkan Yetiser responds to me:

JW: However, there are already scanners that will detect Pogue, as well as
>>  the Mutation Engine. McAfee's scan claims 100 accuracy, Alan Soloman
>>  (at my last discussion with him) was at 99% on the MTE, Fridrik I know
>>  is working on it and undoubtedly will be detecting it very soon, and
>>  our product, Novi 1.1 is currently at about 99.7% on the MTE (current
>>  misses being failures of the Engine to work properly, detection for
>>  which I have yet to add).

TY: I don't have my calculator handy, but how do these people come up with
> these numbers? Science, magic or marketing? I mean, 99.7% is pretty close.
> Such accuracy!

I don't know how the others got their numbers but I made a few thousand
infections and checked what I missed, all the time trying to eliminate
false positives. Current theoretical false positive rate is 1 in 422,000.
(Quick, find your calculator.) :-)

And add one more scanner to the list: Sweep by Sophos.

>   Much truth in that. But if the end-user is only exposed to hype and
>misinformation, how can he expect to see the light? Almost all major
>anti-viral developers boast about their capability to identify four-digit
>virus variants.

Ah yes, the numbers game. I'm looking forward to the McScanner of 2001
(Over 30 billion detected!).

>> Actually, since virus-writers have aimed viruses at specific products,
>> there is no reason not to use more than one.

>   Oh, yeah? The pie is big enough, and the end-user is supposed to pay
>the bill for defeating their knight's foes.

Exactly! As viruses become more and more "just another business expense",
people will have more than one--as is already true for word processors,
graphics programs, databases, disk utilities, backup programs, etc.

>> been doing compatibility testing on my machine for AVPD members and
>> others, at lease to the extent of scanning each other. I generally have
>> the latest versions of CPAV, NAV, ViruSafe, McAfee, Virex-PC, Virx, Virus
>> Buster, Untouchable, AV Toolkit, F-Prot, PCRX, PC-Cillin, and Novi on
>> one of my test machines for just such testing.

>   Petty cash, donation, hobby, or complimentary versions of each one?
>Maybe, it's just know thy competition.

Generally as a favor for the techies I know well at each company. Someone
else at our company does the competitive intelligence.

>   You are right. Isn't it about time the end-user is made aware of better
>solutions? Many people out there do not have the expertise/time/interest to
>perform a sound evaluation and then choose something that better suits
>their personal as well as organizational needs?

And virtually no reviewers know how to test whole "products". All they seem
to be able to do is run scanners against a few kilobytes of different viruses
and chalk up numbers--the "hundreds and hundreds" numbers game again.  Odd
since only about a hundred viruses have ever been seen at more than a
couple of sites "in the wild." (IBM lists 82 viruses with more than one
incident reported, including only 21 with more than 10!) And some of the
"Hundreds" marketeers' products miss some of those 21!

The only review I have seen to date that had a full product review--including
an "unknown virus detection" catagory was the National Software Testing Lab's
Software Digest Report of November 1991. They based their analysis on the
twelve points listed in Peter Denning's "Computers Under Attack" (ACM Press
1990).

FYI, the 12 points (which NSTL actually expanded upon) are:

 1. Impact on System Performance
 2. Dependence on User Intervention
 3. Impact on Productivity
 4. False Alarm Rate
 5. User Experience and Acceptance
 6. Effectiveness Against Viruses (Including scanning numbers.)
 7. Post Mortem Analysis (Audit trail, etc)
 8. Impact on System Resources
 9. Compatibility
10. Training/Usability
11. Supplier/Developer Background
12. Additional Features (NSTL looked at 60)

"May the twelve points of Peter rest on your future analytical meditations."
                            (-: Mediocrates :-)

>> Joseph Wells - Virus Specialist|- Certus International - (216)546-1500
>> Novi Development Team Leader - 0004886415@mcimail.com - CIS 70750,3457

>  Aha, so you do this for a living. Keep up the good work. I hear NOVI
>is well-designed and has convenient features for networked environments.

Yes I do. Yes it is. Novi ranked #1 in the NSTL report above and got the
only perfect "10" in "detects unknown viruses". :-)

Joe

======================================================================
Joseph Wells - Virus Specialist|- Certus International - (216)546-1500
Novi Development Team Leader - 0004886415@mcimail.com - CIS 70750,3457
======================================================================

------------------------------

Date:    16 Apr 92 13:02:20 +0000
>From:    A.APPLEYARD@fs1.metallurgy.umist.ac.uk
Subject: Biohazard symbol for computer viruses?

Someone said that there is no ambiguity between biological and
computer viruses in using biohazard tape to warn of both, since
"computer floppies etc aren't likely to get biocontaminated". Aren't
they!? If a PC is used in a lab that handles bio-infected matter,
animals, etc, there is every chance that computer-associated matter
will get biocontaminated! Anyway, the biohazard destructor man wants
to be able to routinely destroy anything with a biohazard label on
without having to wonder whether it is a computer- associated item or
not, and without having to waste vehicle fuel and incinerator fuel etc
taking a Michelangelo-infected diskpack or whatever to a secure
incinerator as if it was a boxful of cholera-infected animal
dissection bits or whatever.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Apr 92 19:38:00 -0400
>From:    fc <FBCohen@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>
Subject: lies and damn lies

          I have been misquoted a lot, but that last virus-l goes a
bit too far.  I never said that because you can't get 100% of all
viruses you shouldn't try - and it was not a hypothesis.  It was (and
still is) a proven theorem.  I also said "There ain't a horse that
caint be rode, there aint a man that can't be throwed" - in other
words - there's no perfect defense, but there's no perfect attack
either.

          As to getting large percentages of viruses (or at least
large classes) I have never said you shouldn't try - but I have said
that scanners are not as cost effective as integrity techniques as a
day-to-day practice.  I backed it up with some numbers and invited
others to debate the issue.  So far - all of the other analyses have
agreed with mine.

          As for the book - yes, it describes how two secure systems
may produce an insecure network when combined - and many other things
that may have long and short term impact.  As for advertising on V-L I
have to agree - all the other companies seem to use V-L to sell their
products.  I have written to Ken about it before, but he didn't want
to publish my opinion on that subject - perhaps this one will make it.
Having said that, I won't tell you wjere to get the book unless you
contact me directly - after all - that would be advertising.  FC

[Moderator's note: As I said in my note to you, it was not your
_opinion_ that I rejected in your posting, Dr. Cohen.  Your posting
would have been accepted had it adhered to my guidelines - one of
which is that messages be _polite_.  I welcome discussion on the
product announcements which I allow here on the group; based on
feedback from readers, I have accepted the announcements because they
provide a public service.  However, if the majority of the group feels
that they should be eliminated because they are commercial, I will
reject all announcements of commercial products.]

------------------------------

Date:    18 Apr 92 09:16:00 +0000
>From:    Werner Uhrig <werner@cs.utexas.edu>
Subject: CODE 252 Virus - Rival Vaccine info (Mac)

Resent-From: Werner Uhrig <werner@rascal.ics.utexas.edu>
[ NOTE: I will continue to forward all release info by any anti-viral
	author or publisher (with permission) sent to me. ---Werner ]

	 New Rival Vaccine released to combat CODE 252 Virus

Contact:
Microseeds Publishing,Inc.
Web Phillips
5801 Benjamin Center Drive, Suite 103
Tampa, Florida 33634
813-882-8635
Link:MICROPUB

Tampa, FL, April 17,1992 - Microseeds Publishing,Inc. released
a new vaccine for Rival, their anti-virus program for the Macintosh,
to combat the new Macintosh virus "CODE 252".

The CODE 252 vaccine is available in the Microseeds Publishing Third Party
updates section of AppleLink, America Online, CompuServe, and the
Microseeds Publishing BBS (813-885-2686).  Rival owners, who subcribe to
the Rival Express Service, will be automatically sent the CODE 252 vaccine
via U.S. mail.


Rival Refresh 1.1.9v is an application that will update your copy
of Rival 1.1.4 or later to the current version, Rival 1.1.9v.

Rival 1.1.9v may be used with System 6 and System 7, and also contains
an updated vaccine file to combat the CODE 252 virus as of 4/17/92.

Rival 1.1.9v is compatible with More Disk Space.

System Requirements: 6.0 or later
Memory Requirements: 1MB or higher
Hardware Requirements: Mac Plus or better
Rival Requirements: 1.1.4 or later

Microseeds Publishing distributes Rival Refresh free of charge, but please
remember that Rival itself is a commercial program and should not be given
away! Thanks.

- ----------------------------------------------
Rival Refresh 1.1.9v Instructions
- ----------------------------------------------
To update your copy of Rival, double-click on Rival Refresh to open it. Then
select the copy of Rival on your hard disk, and click the Refresh button. In a
few seconds, you will be notified that the update was successful.  You must
restart for the update to take effect.

Note to System 7 users:  If you put Rival Refresh on your hard disk, you can
update Rival by simply dragging your copy of Rival and "drop it into" the Rival
Refresh icon.  You'll be notified that the update was successful, and your copy
of Rival will return to its original location automatically.  If Rival is not
already in the Control Panels folder, move it there and restart.


- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

		[ text from the update floppy (I think) ]


- -----------------------------------
Rival Vaccines 4/17/92
- ----------------------------------
Read Me First: Rival Vaccines 4/17/92
- ----------------------------------
- ----------------------------------
Enclosed is the Rival vaccine to protect against and eradicate the CODE 252
virus. All previous vaccines for Rival are also included as of 4/17/92.

These vaccines can only be used with Rival versions 1.1.4 or later,
and cannot be used with earlier versions.

System Requirements: 6.0 or later
Memory Requirements: 1MB or higher
Hardware Requirements: Mac Plus or better

Microseeds Publishing distributes Rival vaccines free of charge, but please
remember that Rival itself is a commercial program and should not be given
away! Thanks.

- ----------------------------------------------
Instructions for installing new Rival Vaccines
- ----------------------------------------------

1. Pull down the Apple menu and choose Control Panel.

2. Click on the Rival icon in the Control Panel window.

3. Click on the Volumes icon in the Rival mode selector.

4. Use Rival's file list to open the volumes and folders the vaccines are
located in; double-click on a volume or folder icon to open it and display its
contents.

5. Click on the vaccine you wish to install; shift-click to select several
vaccines at once.

 6. Click the Install button to install the vaccine(s). It will take a few
seconds to install each vaccine. When they're installed, Rival will display the
list of vaccines, where you'll see the new vaccine(s) added to the list. NOTE:
To find more about about a vaccine (or the virus it protects against),
double-click on its name.




------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Apr 92 19:03:31 -0700
>From:    rslade@sfu.ca (Robert Slade)
Subject: Checklist part 9



920417   PRTCKL9.CVP

                    Antiviral checklist - part 9

                          For each office: (cont.)

_ Memory and disk mapping utilities

In an earlier column I mentioned the need for memory and disk lists
for each computer.  These areas do not need to be checked constantly,
in most situations, so there is no need for a copy of these utilities
with each computer.  The utilities should, however, be available
quickly and easily, should anything prompt a check.  Checks should
also be done on a regular basis, and these tools can be used on each
computer in turn.

Having said that, many of the utilities needed are already a part of
the operating system.  In the MS-DOS world, CHKDSK, while it will not
show you a graphical map of the disk, will provide information on the
number of bad sectors or hidden files.  With MS-DOS 5, the MEM
program provides needed information regarding memory and interrupt
usage.  The Mac world, and the GUI OSes in general, tend to provide
less of these tools, but I believe that ResEdit is now part of the
Mac OS.

In any case, these utilities are widely available both commercially
and as shareware.  Commercial utility packages often do "double
duty": PCTOOLS probably is sold most often for its backup capability,
but can provide helpful information for other areas as well.
Shareware tools sometimes lack the interface of the commercial tools,
and more often are dedicated to a single task, but frequently have
useful features not found in their commercial counterparts.  (Neither
PCTOOLS nor Norton have the ease of access to specific sectors that
the shareware SHOWFAT has.)

I would also like, at this point, to bring up a related issue.  I
have been receiving feedback, from many sources, all tending to the
same theme: "why not just scan the computer and have done with it."
It has, perhaps, escaped the attention of these readers that at no
point in this checklist have I required the purchase of any specific
antiviral software.  This is deliberate for three reasons.  First,
this checklist is intended as a conceptual guide and is, as far as
possible, intended for the non-specialist user of any system.
Second, it is intended to show that virus protection is possible
without specialized software (although antiviral software can ease
the burden tremendously.)  Third, the most important aspect of virus
protection is that the user know the system.  That cannot happen if
the user is relying on some "magic bullet": there never will be a
magic bullet that will give 100% protection.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1992   PRTCKL9.CVP   920417

==============
Vancouver                               | "A ship in a harbour
Institute for  Robert_Slade@sfu.ca      |  is safe, but that is
Research into  rslade@cue.bc.ca         |  not what ships are
User           CyberStore Dpac 85301030 |  built for."
Security       Canada V7K 2G6           |           John Parks


------------------------------

End of VIRUS-L Digest [Volume 5 Issue 92]
*****************************************
